

**End of Tour Report  
For**

**Ulf Hennricsson, HOM 2006-04-01—08-31**

**Mission mandate and structure:**

The mandate given to the mission is strong and clear but the only "stick" given to the HOM is the media. That stick has been used resulting in a greater respect for the mission. Among other things extra judicial killings and the existence of the Karuna group on government controlled area has become a truth. The structure gives no limits to HOM if he and the monitors have the will and ability to work within a flexible concept of operation.

The mission was set up to work in a situation where the CFA was respected. The idea was that if the parties wanted to take up the hostilities the CFA should be terminated and the mission should be closed. Thus shelters and protection gears were not considered necessary. It has not worked that way but we have seen a gradual increase of violence since one year which ended in open combat where SLMM monitors came under risk. We have all been optimistic that the problems are just occasional and things will improve and the parties will come back to talks. If the initial idea should have been practiced the mission should have been closed at the latest 1 April this year. It was never discussed but end April I requested flak jackets and some other protection gear. We did not start to build shelters at the accommodation or offices due to concerns about the reaction of the rest of the IC and that we did not consider it necessary. We now know how it ended. A monitoring mission shall always be prepared for the worst case because the situation can change very fast but also slow with a "mission creep" with the result described above.

**Concept of operation**

The situation on Sri Lanka can change very fast and the mission area is the whole island, but we are permanently deployed just in the conflict area in the North and East. Even in the Districts there are too few monitors to deal with a major crisis. Thus the concept of operation must be flexible and allow HOM to concentrate monitors to prioritized areas on short notice for shorter or longer periods. The HOM must be prepared to establish a forward command post in the same way.

HOM presence in Kilinochchi must be increased to build up his relation with the LTTE leadership.

**Recruitment:**

The contributing nation must read and understand the SLMM job descriptions and recruit according to them. That has too often not been the case. Individuals who do not fulfill the requirements can be a danger for themselves and their colleagues. The Head of District must be selected with great care. Due to the dispersed deployment they must be independent and have well proven leadership experiences, good understanding of the mission task and the political context. Everybody must understand and accept the consequences of the concept of operation – nobody is promised to work and stay on the same place during the complete tour.

**Training:**

If the job descriptions are respected the present training done by Sweden (three days) and in the mission (three days) is enough. If the present recruitment practice will continue a common training as proposed by SLMM in May must take place to ensure the security and efficiency of the mission. That is a minimum but not enough if the mission shall continue to work under the

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planned circumstances. There are reasons military observers are sent on a three weeks course prior to their first mission.

**Working conditions:**

Security should be improved. The mission needs shelters in accommodations and/or offices dependent of the distance between them. Everyone must have his/her own flak jacket and helmet – in the right size- and the mission needs also some protected cars in each district. The offices are well equipped and of decent standard.

**Living conditions:**

The number of leave days is generous and the accommodations are excellent for a monitoring mission in a conflict area. In Colombo it is convenient to receive visits and even have family members living for longer periods. I think that is good for the mission as long as the mission member is aware of and accept the working conditions 24/7 - if needed.

**Cooperation:**

The internal cooperation has generally been good but as always in an occasionally organized mission there have been personal conflicts. Both HOM and HOD must be able and willing to take immediate action when problems occur. Otherwise gossip, rumors and misunderstandings will be the result and that will put the team spirit at risk. The communication between HQ and DO must be improved. The new office with a common operations room will hopefully increase HQ ability to speak with "one voice". It should be ideal if HQ members could be given at least two month practice in a DO before taking on their position in HQ. HOM must have the intentions to visit each district once a month and mission meeting should be arranged every two weeks to inform and discuss policy and priorities. The cooperation with representatives from the Norwegian government has been excellent and I think there has been a good understanding that the working conditions are very different in the mission from that on the political scene. The outspokenness of HOM might have created some problems for the facilitator but has increased the motivation in the mission and the overall credibility of the mission.

**Cooperation with and between the parties (GOSL and LTTE):**

The cooperation with SCOPP and the PS has been good thou there has definitely been different opinions and some straight forward talks. The main point of contact to both parties should be SCOPP and PS. The relations to the MOD have been bad due to the attitude of the Defense Secretary who wants SLMM to be a smooth, cooperative (to the GoSL) and silent observer. If possible these relations should be improved. Both parties are commanded in details from the top. As long as the top does not allow talks between the parties at lower lever SLMM shall not waste time to arrange that, but talk with them one by one to spread and get information.

**Suggestions for improvements/ recommendations to SLMM:**

Suggestion for improvements can be found in memos "Strengthen the SLMM" and "Own boats for SLMM". The recent security and evacuation problems concerning Jaffna amplify the security arguments for own boats.

The SOP's must be read and understand by everybody – and then respected and obeyed. It is a pity, but HOM and COS must personally engage in controlling this.

**Evaluation**

The present system for personal evaluation is not working properly. Most monitors/staff members are not used to an outspoken and honest evaluation. The monitors/staff members are reluctant to write down their honest view due to fear that it will affect their own evaluation in a negative way.

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Thus the end of four reports is very smooth except from critics towards the HQ and almost all personal evaluations reads "recommended without restrictions". That is a comfortable way to deal with it, but there is a great risk that personal problems and shortcomings are "exported" to another mission.

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